Liability, Risk Perceptions, and Precautions at Bars

Posted: 31 Aug 2000

See all articles by Frank A. Sloan

Frank A. Sloan

Duke University - Center for Health Policy, Law and Management; Duke University, Fuqua School of Business-Economics Group; Duke University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Lan Liang

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Emily M. Stout

Independent

Kathryn Whetten-Godstein

Duke University - Center for Health Policy, Law and Management

Abstract

Are state laws, regulatory practices and allocation of public resources for enforcement reflected in perceptions by bar owners/managers that they will be cited or sued if they fail to exercise care? Among various types of policies, which ones have the greatest impact on risk perceptions and, in turn, on such behaviors? We used data collected in a national survey of bar owners/managers, surveys of state Alcoholic Beverage Control boards, and of police departments located in the same areas as the bars to determine risk perceptions of bar owners/managers of threats of being sued or cited if they were to serve obviously intoxicated adults or minors. Overall, we found that many of the laws, regulations, and public policies relate systematically to risk perceptions of bar owners/managers. This is particularly true of tort. Precautionary measures were more likely to be taken by owners/managers when the risk was perceived to be high.

Suggested Citation

Sloan, Frank A. and Liang, Lan and Stout, Emily M. and Whetten-Godstein, Kathryn, Liability, Risk Perceptions, and Precautions at Bars. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=231798

Frank A. Sloan (Contact Author)

Duke University - Center for Health Policy, Law and Management ( email )

Box 90253
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-684-8047 (Phone)
919-684-6246 (Fax)

Duke University, Fuqua School of Business-Economics Group ( email )

Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0097
United States

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Lan Liang

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Emily M. Stout

Independent

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75238

Kathryn Whetten-Godstein

Duke University - Center for Health Policy, Law and Management ( email )

Box 90253
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-684-8012 (Phone)
919-684-6246 (Fax)

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