Competing for the Attention of Policymakers
45 Pages Posted: 31 Aug 2013
Date Written: August 2013
Abstract
We develop a model of lobbying in which a time and resource constrained policymaker first chooses which policy proposals to learn about, before choosing which to implement. The policymaker reviews the proposals of the interest groups who provide the highest contributions. We study how policy outcomes and contributions depend on policymaker constraints and the design of the "Contest for Attention." Among other results, awarding attention to the highest contributors generally guarantees the first best policy outcome. It can also lead to the highest possible contributions, suggesting that a policymaker may not need to sacrifice policy in order to maximize contributions.
Keywords: All-pay auction, contest, signaling, handicapped contest, political access, lobbying
JEL Classification: D44, D82, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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