Competing for the Attention of Policymakers

45 Pages Posted: 31 Aug 2013

See all articles by Christopher Cotton

Christopher Cotton

Queen's University, Department of Economics

Date Written: August 2013

Abstract

We develop a model of lobbying in which a time and resource constrained policymaker first chooses which policy proposals to learn about, before choosing which to implement. The policymaker reviews the proposals of the interest groups who provide the highest contributions. We study how policy outcomes and contributions depend on policymaker constraints and the design of the "Contest for Attention." Among other results, awarding attention to the highest contributors generally guarantees the first best policy outcome. It can also lead to the highest possible contributions, suggesting that a policymaker may not need to sacrifice policy in order to maximize contributions.

Keywords: All-pay auction, contest, signaling, handicapped contest, political access, lobbying

JEL Classification: D44, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Cotton, Christopher, Competing for the Attention of Policymakers (August 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2318176 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2318176

Christopher Cotton (Contact Author)

Queen's University, Department of Economics ( email )

Dunning Hall 230
Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.christophercotton.ca

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