Takeovers: English and American

Posted: 12 Jun 2000

Abstract

Viewed against the backdrop of European company law generally, the U.K. and U.S. systems of corporate governance are remarkably similar. However, there are several salient differences between the system, including the fact that the U.K. has a more robust and less regulated takeover market than the U.S. This paper explains the differences as a function of politics. In the United States, where corporate law is dominated by state governments, the political forces aligned against hostile takeovers are quite potent, generating legislation and judicial decisions that have suppressed takeover activity. In the United Kingdom, with a more unitary system, the political forces play out differently, and the system accordingly generates rules more accommodating to unfriendly takeovers.

Keywords: Takeovers, Corporate Governance, Politics, Comparative Law

JEL Classification: G34, G39

Suggested Citation

Miller, Geoffrey P., Takeovers: English and American. European Financial Management, Vol. 6, No. 4, December 2000, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=231874

Geoffrey P. Miller (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

Center for the Study of Central Banks
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6329 (Phone)
212-995-4590 (Fax)

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