Monetary Policy Independence in the Erm: Was There Any?

36 Pages Posted: 23 Oct 2000

See all articles by Hali J. Edison

Hali J. Edison

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department

Ronald MacDonald

University of Strathclyde in Glasgow - Department of Economics; Government of New Zealand - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: April 2000

Abstract

Recently proposals for introducing greater exchange rate fixity into the behavior of key exchange rates have become fashionable. One proposal, for example, suggests that a target zone arrangement for the dollar, mark and yen would represent a desirable reform of the international monetary system. The question we seek to address in this paper is how much monetary independence is likely to be conferred on a country participating in such an arrangement. Recent research for the Classical gold standard has suggested that even with a rigidly fixed exchange rate system there is still some scope for monetary independence. Here we examine the extent of monetary independence conferred by a target zone using data from the recent ERM experience. Amongst our findings is the result that countries which had a credible commitment to the target zone had more independence in the operation of their monetary policy than countries with a lesser commitment. It turns out that the monetary independence for a credible participant in a target zone arrangement is longer than that conferred by participation in a regime of rigidly fixed exchange rates, such as the Classical gold standard.

Keywords: interest rate linkages, monetary independence

JEL Classification: F31, F32, F33

Suggested Citation

Edison, Hali J. and MacDonald, Ronald R., Monetary Policy Independence in the Erm: Was There Any? (April 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=231955 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.231955

Hali J. Edison (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-6946 (Phone)
202-589-6946 (Fax)

Ronald R. MacDonald

University of Strathclyde in Glasgow - Department of Economics ( email )

100 Cathedral Street
Glasgow G4 0LN
United Kingdom
+44 141 548 3861 (Phone)

Government of New Zealand - Department of Economics

2 The Terrace
P.O. Box 2498
Wellington
New Zealand

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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