Election Observers and Electoral Fraud
51 Pages Posted: 4 Sep 2013
Date Written: August 23, 2013
Abstract
We use a randomized saturation design to investigate whether domestic election observers reduce electoral fraud in the 2012 presidential elections in Ghana. Results show that observers reduce the probability of overvoting (more votes cast than registered voters) at observed stations by 60 percent. They also reduce unnaturally high levels of turnout and, in political party strongholds, instances of ballot stuffing. Our research design also permits measurement of the displacement effects of election observers and therefore their equilibrium impact on the total amount of fraudulent activity within constituencies. Our data shows that observers induce the strategic relocation of fraud to nearby but unobserved polling places. Displacement is concentrated in the strongholds of Ghana's two major political parties. Displacement decreases as the share of observed polling places in a constituency increases, and at the highest level of observer intensity is reduced to zero even in party strongholds. Our study has implications for understanding the conditions in which parties are able to coordinate electoral fraud and for empirical investigations of governance.
Keywords: elections, electoral fraud, political parties, Ghana
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