Election Observers and Electoral Fraud

51 Pages Posted: 4 Sep 2013

See all articles by Joseph Asunka

Joseph Asunka

The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation

Sarah Brierley

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Political Science

Miriam A. Golden

European University Institute; University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)

Eric Kramon

George Washington University

George Ofosu

London School of Economics and Political Science

Date Written: August 23, 2013

Abstract

We use a randomized saturation design to investigate whether domestic election observers reduce electoral fraud in the 2012 presidential elections in Ghana. Results show that observers reduce the probability of overvoting (more votes cast than registered voters) at observed stations by 60 percent. They also reduce unnaturally high levels of turnout and, in political party strongholds, instances of ballot stuffing. Our research design also permits measurement of the displacement effects of election observers and therefore their equilibrium impact on the total amount of fraudulent activity within constituencies. Our data shows that observers induce the strategic relocation of fraud to nearby but unobserved polling places. Displacement is concentrated in the strongholds of Ghana's two major political parties. Displacement decreases as the share of observed polling places in a constituency increases, and at the highest level of observer intensity is reduced to zero even in party strongholds. Our study has implications for understanding the conditions in which parties are able to coordinate electoral fraud and for empirical investigations of governance.

Keywords: elections, electoral fraud, political parties, Ghana

Suggested Citation

Asunka, Joseph and Brierley, Sarah and Golden, Miriam A. and Kramon, Eric and Ofosu, George, Election Observers and Electoral Fraud (August 23, 2013). 2013 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2319651

Joseph Asunka

The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation ( email )

Menlo Park, CA
United States

Sarah Brierley

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Political Science ( email )

One Brookings Drive
One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

Miriam A. Golden (Contact Author)

European University Institute ( email )

Via dei Roccettini 9
San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, 50014
Italy
50014 (Fax)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) ( email )

Department of Political Science
Box 951472
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1361
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.golden.polisci.ucla.edu

Eric Kramon

George Washington University ( email )

2121 I Street NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States

George Ofosu

London School of Economics and Political Science ( email )

Houghton Street
London, London
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.georgeofosu.com

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