A Theory of Bargaining Deadlock

41 Pages Posted: 4 Sep 2013 Last revised: 2 Feb 2018

Date Written: January 31, 2018

Abstract

I study a dynamic one-sided-offer bargaining model between a seller and a buyer under incomplete information. The seller knows the quality of his product, while the buyer does not. During bargaining, the seller may receive an outside option, the value of which depends on the quality of the product. If the outside option is sufficiently important, there is an equilibrium in which the buyer’s belief about the product’s quality stays constant and she continues to make the same randomized offer throughout the bargaining process. As a result, the equilibrium behavior produces an outcome path that resembles a bargaining deadlock and its resolution. The equilibrium outcome exhibits bargaining delay that does not vanish even with frequent offers, and the limiting delay may exist even without a static adverse selection problem. Under stronger parametric assumptions, the equilibrium with deadlock is the only one in which behavior is monotonic in the buyer’s belief.

Keywords: bargaining game, asymmetric information, bargaining deadlock, delay, Coase conjecture

JEL Classification: C78, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Hwang, Ilwoo, A Theory of Bargaining Deadlock (January 31, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2320550 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2320550

Ilwoo Hwang (Contact Author)

Seoul National University ( email )

Korea, Republic of (South Korea)
+821090856126 (Phone)

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