False-Name-Proof Voting with Costs Over Two Alternatives
19 Pages Posted: 5 Sep 2013
Date Written: September 4, 2013
Abstract
In open, anonymous settings such as the Internet, agents can participate in a mechanism multiple times under different identities. A mechanism is false-name-proof if no agent ever benefits from participating more than once. Unfortunately, the design of false-name-proof mechanisms has been hindered by a variety of negative results. In this paper, we show how some of these negative results can be circumvented by making the realistic assumption that obtaining additional identities comes at a (potentially small) cost. We consider arbitrary such costs and apply our results within the context of a voting model with two alternatives.
Keywords: Mechanism design, false-name-proofness, voting, revelation principle, anonymity
JEL Classification: D70, D72, D78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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