False-Name-Proof Voting with Costs Over Two Alternatives

19 Pages Posted: 5 Sep 2013

See all articles by Liad Wagman

Liad Wagman

Illinois Institute of Technology - Stuart School of Business, IIT

Vincent Conitzer

Duke University

Date Written: September 4, 2013

Abstract

In open, anonymous settings such as the Internet, agents can participate in a mechanism multiple times under different identities. A mechanism is false-name-proof if no agent ever benefits from participating more than once. Unfortunately, the design of false-name-proof mechanisms has been hindered by a variety of negative results. In this paper, we show how some of these negative results can be circumvented by making the realistic assumption that obtaining additional identities comes at a (potentially small) cost. We consider arbitrary such costs and apply our results within the context of a voting model with two alternatives.

Keywords: Mechanism design, false-name-proofness, voting, revelation principle, anonymity

JEL Classification: D70, D72, D78

Suggested Citation

Wagman, Liad and Conitzer, Vincent, False-Name-Proof Voting with Costs Over Two Alternatives (September 4, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2320646 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2320646

Liad Wagman (Contact Author)

Illinois Institute of Technology - Stuart School of Business, IIT ( email )

565 W Adams St Suite 412
Chicago, IL 60661
United States
7739809883 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://lwagman.org

Vincent Conitzer

Duke University ( email )

100 Fuqua Drive
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

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