Shadow Insurance

50 Pages Posted: 6 Sep 2013 Last revised: 19 May 2016

See all articles by Ralph S. J. Koijen

Ralph S. J. Koijen

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Motohiro Yogo

Princeton University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 12, 2016

Abstract

Life insurers use reinsurance to move liabilities from regulated and rated companies that sell policies to shadow reinsurers, which are less regulated and unrated off-balance-sheet entities within the same insurance group. U.S. life insurance and annuity liabilities ceded to shadow reinsurers grew from $11 billion in 2002 to $364 billion in 2012. Life insurers using shadow insurance, which capture half of the market share, ceded 25 cents of every dollar insured to shadow reinsurers in 2012, up from 2 cents in 2002. By relaxing capital requirements, shadow insurance could reduce the marginal cost of issuing policies and thereby improve retail market efficiency. However, shadow insurance could also reduce risk-based capital and increase expected loss for the industry. We model and quantify these effects based on publicly available data and plausible assumptions.

Keywords: Capital regulation, Demand estimation, Life insurance industry, Regulatory arbitrage, Reinsurance

JEL Classification: G22, G28, L11, L51

Suggested Citation

Koijen, Ralph S. J. and Yogo, Motohiro, Shadow Insurance (January 12, 2016). Econometrica, Vol. 84, No. 3, 2016, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 14-64, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2320921 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2320921

Ralph S. J. Koijen

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/ralph.koijen/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Motohiro Yogo (Contact Author)

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Julis Romo Rabinowitz Building
Princeton, NJ 08544
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/motohiroyogo/

National Bureau of Economic Research

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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