Perceptual Content Defended

Noûs, 45 (4), Dec. 2011, pp. 714-750

37 Pages Posted: 29 Sep 2013 Last revised: 19 Jul 2014

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids the objections of austere relationalists. The main thesis of the paper is that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. I argue that most objections to the thesis that experience has content are objections only against accounts of perceptual content on which perceptual relations to the world play no explanatory role. With austere relationalists, I will argue that perceptual experience is fundamentally relational. But against austere relationalists, I will argue that it is fundamentally both relational and representational.

Suggested Citation

Schellenberg, Susanna, Perceptual Content Defended (2011). Noûs, 45 (4), Dec. 2011, pp. 714-750, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2332043 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2332043

Susanna Schellenberg (Contact Author)

Rutgers University ( email )

94 Rockafeller Road
New Brunswick, NJ 08901
United States

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