Reducing Systemic Relevance -- A Proposal

German Council of Economic Experts Working Paper 04/2010

Posted: 2 Oct 2013

See all articles by Hasan Doluca

Hasan Doluca

Baden-Wuerttemberg Cooperative State University Mosbach

Ulrich H. Klueh

International Monetary Fund (IMF); German Council of Economic Experts

Marco Wagner

University of Bayreuth - Faculty of Law, Business and Economics

Beatrice Weder di Mauro

Graduate Institute Geneva, IHEID; Graduate Institute Geneva, IHEID

Date Written: May 1, 2010

Abstract

This paper presents a proposal for a regulatory regime aimed at reducing systemic risk effectively and internationally. Systemic relevance should be internalized with a levy (or tax), the level of which (or tax rate) rises with the systemic relevance of an institution (Pigouvian taxation). The levy should be complemented by a Systemic Risk Fund which is endowed with control rights, in particular early intervention and resolution powers. The Systemic Risk Fund should be funded by the proceeds from the levy; if the Fund reaches a certain threshold size, the continuing flow of contributions is distributed to the government(s). Systemic Risk Funds implemented on the global, European, and national level would solve the issue mitigating risks also cross-border and provide a framework for burden-sharing.

Keywords: Systemic Risk Fund, systemic relevance, levy, tax, surcharge, financial institutions, Basel II

JEL Classification: G01, G15, G18, G28

Suggested Citation

Doluca, Hasan and Klueh, Ulrich H. and Wagner, Marco and Weder di Mauro, Beatrice and Weder di Mauro, Beatrice, Reducing Systemic Relevance -- A Proposal (May 1, 2010). German Council of Economic Experts Working Paper 04/2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2334855

Hasan Doluca (Contact Author)

Baden-Wuerttemberg Cooperative State University Mosbach ( email )

Lohrtalweg 10
Mosbach, 74821
Germany

Ulrich H. Klueh

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

German Council of Economic Experts ( email )

Federal Statistical Office
Gustav-Stresemann-Ring 11
Wiesbaden, Hessen 65180
Germany

Marco Wagner

University of Bayreuth - Faculty of Law, Business and Economics ( email )

University of Bayreuth
Dept. of Law and Economics
Bayreuth, 95447
Germany
+49(0)921/552914 (Phone)
+49(0)921/552949 (Fax)

Beatrice Weder di Mauro

Graduate Institute Geneva, IHEID ( email )

Chemin Eugene Rigot 2
Geneva, 1211
Switzerland

Graduate Institute Geneva, IHEID ( email )

Geneva Avenue de la Paix 11A
Geneva, 1202
Switzerland
1211 (Fax)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
567
PlumX Metrics