Sovereigns Versus Banks: Credit, Crises, and Consequences

35 Pages Posted: 7 Oct 2013

See all articles by Oscar Jorda

Oscar Jorda

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco; University of California, Davis - Department of Economics

Moritz Schularick

University of Bonn - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Alan M. Taylor

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2013

Abstract

Two separate narratives have emerged in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. One speaks of private financial excess and the key role of the banking system in leveraging and deleveraging the economy. The other emphasizes the public sector balance sheet over the private and worries about the risks of lax fiscal policies. However, the two may interact in important and understudied ways. This paper studies the co-evolution of public and private sector debt in advanced countries since 1870. We find that in advanced economies financial stability risks have come from private sector credit booms and not from the expansion of public debt. However, we find evidence that high levels of public debt have tended to exacerbate the effects of private sec- tor deleveraging after crises, leading to more prolonged periods of economic depression. Fiscal space appears to be a constraint in the aftermath of a crisis, then and now.

Keywords: booms, business cycles, financial crises, leverage, local projections, recessions

JEL Classification: C14, C52, E51, F32, F42, N10, N20

Suggested Citation

Jorda, Oscar and Schularick, Moritz and Taylor, Alan M., Sovereigns Versus Banks: Credit, Crises, and Consequences (October 2013). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9678, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337009

Oscar Jorda (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/economists/oscar-jorda/

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics ( email )

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Davis, CA 95616-8578
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HOME PAGE: http://old.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/jorda/

Moritz Schularick

University of Bonn - Department of Economics ( email )

Bonn
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Alan M. Taylor

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Shields Drive
Davis, CA 95616-8578
United States
530-752-1572 (Phone)
530-752-9382 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/amtaylor/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://nber.org

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://cepr.org

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