Preliminary Review of Over Regulation in Australian Financial Services

24 Pages Posted: 2 Nov 2013

See all articles by Michael Adams

Michael Adams

University of New England

Angus Young

University of Technology Sydney, Faculty of Law

Marina Nehme

UNSW Australia

Date Written: October 31, 2006

Abstract

This article examines a preliminary review and the limited evidence of over-regulation in Australian financial services. The 1997 Wallis Report and the CLERP 6 paper, resulted in the amendments to Ch 7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) by the Financial Services Reform Act. Nearly a decade later the system based upon ‘one-size fits all’, dual track regime and a consistent licensing regime has greatly increased the costs of compliance. In the area of enforcement there has not been a dramatic change to the effective techniques applied by ASIC over other agencies, such as APRA. In particular there are clear economic arguments, as well as international experiences which state that a single financial services regulator is more effective than the multi-layered approach adopted in Australia. Finally, in the superannuation area of financial services, which is worth A$800 billion, there is unnecessary dual licensing and duplicated regulation, with little evidence of any consumer-member benefit, but at a much greater cost.

Suggested Citation

Adams, Michael Andrew and Young, Angus and Nehme, Marina, Preliminary Review of Over Regulation in Australian Financial Services (October 31, 2006). Australian Journal of Corporate Law Vol. 20, No. 1, p. 1, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2348443

Michael Andrew Adams

University of New England ( email )

Armidale
Armidale, 2351
Australia

Angus Young

University of Technology Sydney, Faculty of Law ( email )

Sydney
Australia

Marina Nehme (Contact Author)

UNSW Australia ( email )

UNSW Sydney NSW
Kensington, NSW 2052
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.unsw.edu.au/profile/marina-nehme

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