Opacity and Liquidity

47 Pages Posted: 2 Nov 2013 Last revised: 7 Dec 2014

See all articles by André Stenzel

André Stenzel

Bank of Canada

Wolf Wagner

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR)

Date Written: December 07, 2014

Abstract

We present a model that links the opacity of an asset to its liquidity. While low opacity assets are liquid, intermediate levels of opacity provide incentives for investors to acquire private information, causing adverse selection and illiquidity. High opacity, however, benefits liquidity by reducing the value of a unit of private information to investors. The cross-section of bid-ask spreads of U.S. firms is shown to be consistent with this hump-shape relationship between opacity and illiquidity. The analysis suggests that uniform disclosure requirements may not be desirable; optimal information provision can be achieved by subsidizing information. The model also delivers predictions about when it is optimal for asset originators to sell intransparent products or pools composed of correlated assets.

Keywords: endogenous information acquisition, opacity, asset liquidity

JEL Classification: G14, D82, G18

Suggested Citation

Stenzel, André and Wagner, Wolf, Opacity and Liquidity (December 07, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2348826 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2348826

André Stenzel

Bank of Canada ( email )

234 Wellington Street
Ontario, Ottawa K1A 0G9
Canada

Wolf Wagner (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) ( email )

Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
3000 DR Rotterdam, Zuid-Holland 3062PA
Netherlands

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