Blumberg on Moral Criticism

Abstract

D. Blumbergi identifies three kinds of moral criticism: (i) of an individual for violating a moral practice in his society, (2) of a moral practice but not the individual who participates in it, and (3) of both an individual and the practice in accordance with which he acts ('practice- personal' criticism) (p. 348). According to Mr. Blumberg, successful derivation of a conclusive "ought"-statement from statements about socially-created obligations would show how moral criticisms of type 1 are justified. Moral criticisms of type 2 would still be allowed, but not those of type 3. -/- I discuss the following points made by Blumberg: (A) Criticism of type 1 is 'the most common kind of moral judgment' (p. 356); (B) Searle dispensed 'with the conclusive aspect of the conclusion, and with it the finality of the derivation, when it began to seem unrealizable' (p. 356); (C) "It is impossible to derive conclusive ought-statements embodying our traditional moral outlook from statements about socially-created obligations..." (p. 355); (D) 'Either we surrender the attempt to derive a conclusive "ought"-statement from statements about socially-created obligations, or else we must surrender our right to make practice- personal criticisms' (p. 357). -/- I argue that conclusiveness in judgments, both moral and non-moral, is always relative to the range of reasons weighed, the implications of action considered. Therefore "ought" must always be taken to be context-bound just as moral principles are taken to be defeasible, elliptical. This interpretation of "ought" and "conclusive" as bound to a context, point of view or framework, is quite consistent with Searle's distinction between what is internal and external to an institution. [Note: published sub. nom. L.V. Brettler; full-text available on JSTOR].

Keywords: moral criticism, ought, social obligation, conclusiveness, finality, context-bound, human rights, moral argumentation, moral reasoning, social institution, Searle, stand-point, point of view, internal versus external,