D&O Insurance and IPO Performance: What Can We Learn from Insurers?

52 Pages Posted: 9 Nov 2013 Last revised: 12 Sep 2014

See all articles by M. Martin Boyer

M. Martin Boyer

HEC Montreal - Department of Finance

Léa H. Stern

University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business

Date Written: February 24, 2014

Abstract

We investigate whether a firm’s directors’ and officers’ liability insurance contract at the time of the IPO is related to insured firms’ first year post-IPO performance. We find that insurers charge a higher premium per dollar of coverage to protect the directors and officers of firms that will subsequently have poor first year post-IPO stock performance. A higher price of coverage is also associated with a higher post-IPO volatility and lower Sharpe ratio. Our results are robust to various econometric specifications and suggest that even when the high level of information asymmetry inherent to the IPO context prevails, insurers have information about the firms’ prospects that should be valuable to outside investors.

Keywords: D&O insurance, Initial Public Offering, return predictability, stock return volatility, information asymmetry, governance indices

JEL Classification: G22, G30, G39

Suggested Citation

Boyer, M. Martin and Stern, Lea H., D&O Insurance and IPO Performance: What Can We Learn from Insurers? (February 24, 2014). Journal of Financial Intermediation, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2351375 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2351375

M. Martin Boyer

HEC Montreal - Department of Finance ( email )

3000 Chemin de la Cote-Sainte-Catherine
Montreal, Quebec H3T 2A7
Canada

Lea H. Stern (Contact Author)

University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business ( email )

Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States

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