The Great Pyramids of America: A Revised History of Us Business Groups, Corporate Ownership and Regulation, 1930-1950

59 Pages Posted: 10 Dec 2013 Last revised: 22 Apr 2023

See all articles by Eugene Kandel

Eugene Kandel

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Konstantin Kosenko

Bank of Israel

Randall Morck

University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research

Yishay Yafeh

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Jerusalem School of Business Administration; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Date Written: December 2013

Abstract

Most listed firms are freestanding in the U.S, while listed firms in other countries often belong to business groups: lasting structures in which listed firms control other listed firms. Hand-collected historical data illuminate how the present ownership structure of the United States arose: (1) Until the mid-20th century, US corporate ownership was unexceptional: large pyramidal groups dominated many industries; (2) About half of these resembled groups elsewhere today in being industrially diversified and family controlled; but the others were tightly focused and had widely held apex firms; (3) US business groups disappeared gradually, primarily in the 1940s, and by 1950 were largely gone; Their demise took place against growing concerns that they posed a threat to competition and even to society; (4) The data link the disappearance of business groups to reforms that targeted them explicitly – the Public Utility Holding Company Act (1935) and rising intercorporate dividend taxation (after 1935), or indirectly – enhanced investor protection (after 1934), the Investment Company Act (1940) and escalating estate taxes. Banking reforms and rejuvenated antitrust enforcement may have indirectly contributed too. These reforms, sustained in a lasting anti-big business climate, promoted the dissolution of existing groups and discouraged the formation of new ones. Thus, a multi-pronged reform agenda, sustained by a supportive political climate, created an economy of freestanding firms.

Suggested Citation

Kandel, Eugene and Kosenko, Konstantin and Morck, Randall K. and Yafeh, Yishay, The Great Pyramids of America: A Revised History of Us Business Groups, Corporate Ownership and Regulation, 1930-1950 (December 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w19691, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2366005

Eugene Kandel (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics ( email )

School of Business
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Israel
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Konstantin Kosenko

Bank of Israel ( email )

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Randall K. Morck

University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Yishay Yafeh

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Jerusalem School of Business Administration ( email )

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Israel
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HOME PAGE: http://bschool.huji.ac.il/facultye/yafeh/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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United Kingdom

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