Voluntary Disclosure in a Multi-Audience Setting: An Empirical Investigation

35 Pages Posted: 12 Sep 2000

See all articles by Sanjeev Bhojraj

Sanjeev Bhojraj

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management

Walter G. Blacconiere

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Accounting

Julia D'Souza

Cornell University - Department of Accounting

Date Written: July 11, 2000

Abstract

We investigate the issue of voluntary disclosure in multi-audience settings by focusing on the electric utility industry as it transitions toward deregulation. We consider three target audiences: industry regulators, capital market participants, and product market competitors. As predicted, we find that utilities tend to disclose less strategic information in jurisdictions where the stranded cost recovery issue is unresolved, consistent with incentives to appear "weak" to regulators. Further, we find that utilities whose viability in a deregulated environment is more uncertain tend to provide more disclosures, unless they face greater threat from competitors. These results are consistent with prior theoretical research on conflicting disclosure incentives to capital markets versus product markets.

Key Words: Voluntary disclosure; Electric utilities; Deregulation

JEL Classification: M41, M45, L51

Suggested Citation

Bhojraj, Sanjeev and Blacconiere, Walter G. and D'Souza, Julia M., Voluntary Disclosure in a Multi-Audience Setting: An Empirical Investigation (July 11, 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=236751 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.236751

Sanjeev Bhojraj

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

Department of Accounting
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-4069 (Phone)
607-254-4590 (Fax)

Walter G. Blacconiere

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Accounting ( email )

1309 E. 10th Street
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-855-2653 (Phone)
812-855-4985 (Fax)

Julia M. D'Souza (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Department of Accounting ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-2349 (Phone)
607-254-4590 (Fax)

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