Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance
82 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2013
Date Written: 1991
Abstract
When international trade and investment increase, so does the need for satisfactory means of dispute resolution. Dispute resolution in national courts requires that litigants consider not only the likelihood of a favorable judgment but also the ability to collect on that judgment. In cases where the defendant’s assets lie in another jurisdiction, collection is possible only if the second jurisdiction will recognize the first jurisdiction’s judgment.
In the international arena, enforcement of United State judgments overseas is often possible only if the United States court rendering the judgment would enforce a similar decision of the foreign enforcing court. This reciprocity requirement places emphasis on the United States law regarding recognition and enforcement. United States courts have been customarily liberal in recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments.
After reviewing the status of the law on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States, this Article discusses prior attempts at providing uniformity and international acceptability. This Article considers “uniform” state legislation, multilateral treaties, bilateral treaties, federal legislation, federal common law, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Each has advantages and disadvantages depending on the factors considered most important in a given circumstance.
Unfortunately, the outlook for positive change is not promising. The lack of clear connection between enforcement of foreign judgments in United States courts and enforcement of United States judgments overseas is likely to continue to frustrate attempts at uniformity in United States law.
Keywords: Procedural rules of enforcement, foreign-money judgments, dispute resolution, Uniform Foreign Judgments Act, Uniform Foreign Money-Judgements Recognition Act, due process, fraud, in personam jurisdiction, in rem jurisdiction, foreign reciprocity requirements, treaties, legislative reform, litigation
JEL Classification: K19, K33
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
By Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole
-
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
By Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole
-
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
By Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole
-
Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation?
By Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter
-
Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation?
By Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter
-
Psychological Foundations of Incentives
By Ernst Fehr and Armin Falk
-
Psychological Foundations of Incentives
By Armin Falk and Ernst Fehr
-
Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation?
By Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter
-
The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives - Trust and Trustworthiness Among CEOS
By Ernst Fehr and John A. List
-
Honesty in Managerial Reporting
By John Evans, R. Lynn Hannan, ...