A Dual Dutch Auction in Taipei: The Choice of Numeraire and Auction Form in Multi-Object Auctions with Bundling

UCSD Economics Discussion Paper No. 2000-10

23 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2000

See all articles by Vincent P. Crawford

Vincent P. Crawford

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Economics; University of Oxford - Department of Economics

Ping-Sing Kuo

Academia Sinica - Institute of Economics

Date Written: June 2000

Abstract

In Taipei we observed a dual Dutch fish auction, like a conventional Dutch auction with bundling but with the roles of quantity and price reversed, and fish the numeraire rather than money. This paper uses a symmetric independent private values framework to study how duality interacts with auction form when agents' utility functions are linear in money but strictly concave in fish. With known buyers' values, conventional and dual auctions, English or Dutch, are equivalent. With values known to buyers but not the seller, the seller prefers conventional to dual auctions. With privately known values, the seller can prefer either a dual Dutch auction or a conventional English or Dutch auction, but he prefers all three to a dual English auction.

Keywords: English and Dutch Auctions, Revenue-Equivalence, Multi-Object Auctions, Bundling

JEL Classification: C72, D44, D82

Suggested Citation

Crawford, Vincent P. and Kuo, Ping-Sing, A Dual Dutch Auction in Taipei: The Choice of Numeraire and Auction Form in Multi-Object Auctions with Bundling (June 2000). UCSD Economics Discussion Paper No. 2000-10, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=237001 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.237001

Vincent P. Crawford (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Economics ( email )

Department of Economics
9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093-0508
United States
302-729-3230 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~v2crawford/

University of Oxford - Department of Economics ( email )

All Souls College
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 4AL
United Kingdom
+44-1865-279339 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~v2crawford/

Ping-Sing Kuo

Academia Sinica - Institute of Economics ( email )

128 Academia Road, Section 2
Nankang
Taipei, 11529
Taiwan
886-2-27853946 (Phone)
886-2-27822791 (Fax)

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