The Open Government Index Initiative: A Colombian Tool for Preventing Institutional Corruption

29 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2014

See all articles by Juan Pablo Remolina

Juan Pablo Remolina

Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics

Date Written: January 9, 2014

Abstract

Corruption has become the most problematic factor for doing business in Colombia as well as a more acceptable form of behavior among its citizens. The Procuraduría is an independent body in charge of overseeing legal compliance in this country. Although Colombia has one of the strongest legal anti-corruption mechanisms in the world, it evidences low levels of implementation. What is the Procuraduría doing to increase compliance with anticorruption laws? Under the scope of its preventive function, and based on the “Fraud Triangle” framework, the Procuraduría designed the Open Government Index (OGI) Initiative in 2010. The OGI measures levels of implementation of anti-corruption laws in all 1,133 local governments in Colombia. Data comes from 76 national and local public entities. Local governments are ranked based on the scores obtained in OGI, which are published in annual reports and discussed in “State Compliance Anti-Corruption Meetings.” Despite challenges, analyses show that the OGI has increased the use of legal barriers to corruption by thirty-three percent in two years. Key lessons have been learned from this process. Use of the right tool by the right institution can convene a collaborative effort across public entities, which provides integrated feedback to local governments for immediate decision making.

Keywords: Institutional corruption, open government index, information management value chain, anti-corruption laws, public management control, preventive tools

Suggested Citation

Remolina, Juan Pablo, The Open Government Index Initiative: A Colombian Tool for Preventing Institutional Corruption (January 9, 2014). Edmond J. Safra Working Papers, No. 34, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2377021 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2377021

Juan Pablo Remolina (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics ( email )

124 Mount Auburn Street
Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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