Economics and/of Science: The Meaning(s) of Financial Bias and the Ideal of Interest-Free Science in Law

SMU Science & Technology Law Review, Vol. 16, 2013

Villanova Law/Public Policy Research Paper No. 2014-1001

23 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2014

See all articles by David S. Caudill

David S. Caudill

Villanova University School of Law

Date Written: 2013

Abstract

Images of scientific research and funding conventions are important in legal contexts when, for example, a trial judge or agency administrator evaluates the integrity of a scientific expert or risk assessment report — is industry affiliation or sponsorship of research a marker of bias, and should the results of “independent” research be given greater weight? In the discourse concerning the commercialization of science, there is a geography of positions reflecting different images of how science is affected by, or alternatively rises above, financial or economic pressures or entanglements. Of course, science costs and has always cost a lot of money, but then the real debate begins on the question of whether financial interests or entanglements are (i) relatively benign, insofar as science is externally supported but not internally affected by money (except in the case of fraud, the occasional bad apple), (ii) seriously influential, especially nowadays, but generally good for science by fostering efficiency and innovation, or (iii) seriously influential, especially nowadays, with identifiable pernicious effects that variously degrade the quality of science, including the science on which law relies in litigation and policy contexts.

In this article, I briefly introduce the notion that the economy “shapes” science, and then discuss the perceived direct, adverse effects of industry on science in legal contexts. Next, I discuss the indirect effects of commercial culture — “less overt, but far more pervasive” — on science. I conclude that legal discourses concerning scientific expertise would be enriched by viewing science as structured and constituted, not merely influenced or supported, by economic forces.

Legal literature on scientific expertise too often focuses on the need for “fair, unbiased testimony and opinions” that are not “swayed by monetary reward.” Legal scholars highlight direct conflicts of interest, but rarely discuss the systemic and structural effects on “how we do research or what we find there.” An individualistic focus on more frequent disclosure of financial conflicts of interest, higher methodological quality, or making sure that one avoids favoring “a particular outcome [or accepting] remuneration geared to the outcome of a research project,” does not begin to address the systematic and structural changes brought about by economic forces on science. Such changes are not only hard to identify and even more difficult to measure, but they also require a new vocabulary or discursive regime. An interdisciplinary engagement with the growing literature on the economics of science reveals that the appropriate analytical division for legal assessments of scientific reliability is not simply between good scientists and those guilty of misconduct (an easier problem to identify), or between commercially funded and “independent” research (because either may or may not be biased), but rather a more complex (albeit fundamental) division between open and privatized science.

Keywords: science funding, scientific evidence, scientific bias, economics, science

Suggested Citation

Caudill, David S., Economics and/of Science: The Meaning(s) of Financial Bias and the Ideal of Interest-Free Science in Law (2013). SMU Science & Technology Law Review, Vol. 16, 2013, Villanova Law/Public Policy Research Paper No. 2014-1001, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2390835

David S. Caudill (Contact Author)

Villanova University School of Law ( email )

299 N. Spring Mill Road
Villanova, PA 19085
United States
610-519-7085 (Phone)
610-519-6282 (Fax)

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