Covenants in European Investment-Grade Corporate Bonds

23 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2014 Last revised: 10 Jan 2015

See all articles by Lars Hornuf

Lars Hornuf

Technische Universität Dresden; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Markus Reps

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU)

Stefan Schäferling

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Law

Date Written: January 10, 2015

Abstract

Covenants are a type of contractual protection for creditors in debt financing. They are used in bond contracts to control the issuer’s management activity and to attenuate conflicting goals existing between shareholders and bondholders. The article provides an overview of covenants and the way they function against the background of financial theory. It further provides detailed data on how often covenants are actually used in corporate bonds issued predominantly by European issuers. Examining the rights of fixed-income investors vis-à-vis bond issuers contributes to the increasingly significant and growing research on debt governance, which addresses, inter alia, the optimal drafting of bond contracts.

Keywords: bond financing, covenants, creditor protection, debt governance

JEL Classification: G3, K12, K22

Suggested Citation

Hornuf, Lars and Reps, Markus and Schäferling, Stefan, Covenants in European Investment-Grade Corporate Bonds (January 10, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2393291 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2393291

Lars Hornuf (Contact Author)

Technische Universität Dresden ( email )

Dresden, 01307
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.hornuf.com

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Markus Reps

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) ( email )

Institute of International Law
Veterinärstr. 5
Munich, 80539
Germany
+49 89 2180 2109 (Phone)

Stefan Schäferling

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Law ( email )

Veterinarstr. 5
Munich, 80539
Germany

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