Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Sender-Receiver Signaling Games

Posted: 24 Mar 2001

See all articles by Christopher M. Anderson

Christopher M. Anderson

University of Rhode Island - Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics

Colin Camerer

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Abstract

We apply Camerer and Ho's experience-weighted attraction (EWA) model of learning to extensive-form signaling games. Since these games often have many equilibria, logical 'refinements' have been used to predict which equilibrium will occur. Brandts and Holt conjectured that belief formation could lead to less refined equilibria, and confirmed their conjecture experimentally. Our adaptation of EWA to signaling games includes a formalization of the Brandts-Holt belief formation idea as a special case. We find that the Brandts-Holt dynamic captures the direction of switching from one strategy to another, but does not capture the rate at which switching occurs. EWA does better at predicting the rate of switching (and also forecasts better than reinforcement models). Extensions of EWA which update unchosen signals by different functions of the set of unobserved foregone payoffs further improve predictive accuracy.

Keywords and Phrases: Learning, Game theory experiments, Signaling games, Equilibrium refinement.

JEL Classification: C72, C92

Suggested Citation

Anderson, Christopher M. and Camerer, Colin F., Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Sender-Receiver Signaling Games. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=239397

Christopher M. Anderson (Contact Author)

University of Rhode Island - Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics ( email )

213 Kingston Coastal Institute
One Greenhouse Road
Kingston, RI 02881
United States

Colin F. Camerer

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

1200 East California Blvd.
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States
626-395-4054 (Phone)
626-432-1726 (Fax)

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