Partisan Governance and Policy Implementation: The Politics of Academy Conversion Amongst English Schools

36 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2014 Last revised: 16 Feb 2015

See all articles by Timothy Hicks

Timothy Hicks

University College London - School of Public Policy

Date Written: February 11, 2014

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that party-political orientations within governance communities can have strong effects on policy implementation. Empirical evidence is drawn from the Academy conversion scheme for secondary schools in England that was recently pursued by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government. The opt-in nature of the reform makes it possible to discern the impact that nominally apolitical school governors have on the implementation of the policy. Academy conversion is disproportionately found in more Conservative-voting constituencies due to varying school-level propensities to apply to convert, rather than varying propensities for the Department for Education to authorize conversions. Further, applications to convert are significantly more likely from schools in Conservative parliamentary seats that are under the control of Labour local authorities. Thus, nominally apolitical policy participants appear to act in rather political ways, which has implications for our understanding of the involvement of civil society in the provision of public services.

Keywords: England, Education, Partisan, Politics, Policy Implementation

JEL Classification: I20, I28, D73

Suggested Citation

Hicks, Timothy, Partisan Governance and Policy Implementation: The Politics of Academy Conversion Amongst English Schools (February 11, 2014). Public Administration, 92(4), pp. 995-1016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2394196

Timothy Hicks (Contact Author)

University College London - School of Public Policy ( email )

29/30 Tavistock Square
London, WC1H 9QU
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://tim.hicks.me.uk/

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