Why the Luck Problem Isn't

Abstract

Libertarianism about free will is the view that we have free will of a variety that is incompatible with the thesis of determinism. A traditional challenge to such views is something called "The Luck Problem." In its most basic form, the worry is that if free will involves non-deterministic causation, exercises of free agency are necessary subject to some or another form of luck. The Luck Problem is frequently regarded as among the most serious challenges to the tenability of libertarian theories of free will. Indeed, one of the main reasons to adopt the primary competitor position — compatibilism, or the view that free will is compatible with determinism — has historically been the thought that the luck problem constitutes an insurmountable problem for libertarianism.

This paper argues for a new understanding of the Luck Problem and its significance. On the present account, either the Luck Problem is also a problem for compatibilists, or else it is not a problem for either libertarians or compatibilists. After arguing for this dilemma, I show why the most promising horn to take is the "no problem for either." The core of the argument is that there is good reason to think at least some compatibilist accounts have a satisfactory answer to the Luck Problem, and that (surprisingly) many libertarian accounts can help themselves to that solution.

Keywords: libertarianism, luck, compatibilism, free will, moral responsibility, indeterminism