Blind in Their Own Cause: The Military Courts in the West Bank

Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law (2)4: 739–763 (2013)

26 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2014

See all articles by Yael Ronen

Yael Ronen

Academic Center for Science and Law, Hod Hasharon; Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law, Minerva Center for Human Rights

Date Written: February 19, 2014

Abstract

The military courts operating in the West Bank do not ordinarily regard the criminal system they enforce as governed by the law of occupation. Their reasoning for this view reveals that they perceive themselves as quasi-domestic courts. This approach removes the guarantee of basic protection for protected persons under the law of occupation, leaving suspects and defendants hostage to potential vagaries of the military commander in enacting the security legislation. The courts' responses to this shortfall in protection are principally that in practice, many of the international standards have been incorporated into the law applied in the military courts by duplication of Israeli law, and that Israel's High Court of Justice offers means of ensuring compliance of the criminal process with international law. Both responses further reflect the courts' abdication of their role in guaranteeing legal protection under the law of occupation.

JEL Classification: Military courts, law of occupation, monism, dualism, Israel

Suggested Citation

Ronen, Yael, Blind in Their Own Cause: The Military Courts in the West Bank (February 19, 2014). Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law (2)4: 739–763 (2013), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2398313

Yael Ronen (Contact Author)

Academic Center for Science and Law, Hod Hasharon ( email )

5 Margoa St.
Hod Hasharon, 45101
Israel

HOME PAGE: http://en.mishpat.ac.il/yael_ronen/

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law, Minerva Center for Human Rights ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, 9190501
Israel

HOME PAGE: http://https://en.law.huji.ac.il/people/yael-ronen

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