The Dynamics of Mergers Among (Ex)Co-Conspirators in the Shadow of Cartel Enforcement

44 Pages Posted: 9 Apr 2014

See all articles by Leslie M. Marx

Leslie M. Marx

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business, Economics Group

Jun Zhou

Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Date Written: March 2014

Abstract

We investigate cartelists’ merger behavior using European Commission (EC) cartel decisions over a 28-year span and information on cartelists’ merger activities over the last 30 years. We find that mergers occur frequently. But they cluster in a few particular industries and usually include only a minority of the cartel participants. The EC’s leniency programs expedite mergers. The EC’s cartel settlement procedure delays merger. After cartel dissolution, co-conspirators merge at a substantially greater pace. The results shed light on the design of merger policies and enforcement programs against cartels.

Keywords: antitrust, leniency, discrete-time survival analysis

JEL Classification: D43, K21, K42, L13

Suggested Citation

Marx, Leslie M. and Zhou, Jun, The Dynamics of Mergers Among (Ex)Co-Conspirators in the Shadow of Cartel Enforcement (March 2014). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2014-013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2416893 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2416893

Leslie M. Marx (Contact Author)

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business, Economics Group ( email )

Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0097
United States

Jun Zhou

Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University ( email )

Ramat Gan
Ramat Gan, 52900
Israel

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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