The Dynamics of Mergers Among (Ex)Co-Conspirators in the Shadow of Cartel Enforcement
44 Pages Posted: 9 Apr 2014
Date Written: March 2014
Abstract
We investigate cartelists’ merger behavior using European Commission (EC) cartel decisions over a 28-year span and information on cartelists’ merger activities over the last 30 years. We find that mergers occur frequently. But they cluster in a few particular industries and usually include only a minority of the cartel participants. The EC’s leniency programs expedite mergers. The EC’s cartel settlement procedure delays merger. After cartel dissolution, co-conspirators merge at a substantially greater pace. The results shed light on the design of merger policies and enforcement programs against cartels.
Keywords: antitrust, leniency, discrete-time survival analysis
JEL Classification: D43, K21, K42, L13
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation