The Impacts of Feed-In Tariffs on Innovation: Empirical Evidence from Germany

22 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2014

See all articles by Christoph Boehringer

Christoph Boehringer

University of Oldenburg

Alexander N. Cuntz

Chair of Innovation Economics; Competence Center Innovation and Regulation

Dietmar Harhoff

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Emmanuel Asane-Otoo

University of Oldenburg

Date Written: March 10, 2014

Abstract

Feed-in tariffs under the Renewable Energy Sources Act, the so-called Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG), have triggered a massive expansion of electricity from renewable energy sources in Germany over the last decade. The increase in non-competitive renewable power generation though went hand in hand with a substantial rise in electricity prices with consumers paying for the renewable energy subsidies. The high cost burden has provoked an intense public debate on the benefits of renewable energy promotion. In this paper, we assess one popular justification for feed-in tariffs, i.e., induced innovation as a positive spillover externality. Based on regressions with a time-technology fixed effect negative binomial model, we find that innovation impacts of feed-in tariffs under the EEG are insignificant.

Keywords: renewable energy promotion, feed-in tariffs, innovation, negative binomial regression

JEL Classification: C230, H230, O380

Suggested Citation

Böhringer, Christoph and Cuntz, Alexander N. and Harhoff, Dietmar and Asane-Otoo, Emmanuel, The Impacts of Feed-In Tariffs on Innovation: Empirical Evidence from Germany (March 10, 2014). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4680, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2419859 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2419859

Christoph Böhringer

University of Oldenburg ( email )

Ammerländer Heerstraße 114-118
Oldenburg, D-26111
Germany

Alexander N. Cuntz

Chair of Innovation Economics ( email )

Straße des 17
Berlin
Germany

Competence Center Innovation and Regulation ( email )

Breslauer Str. 48
Karlsruhe, 76139
United States

Dietmar Harhoff

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany
+49 89 24246 550 (Phone)
+49 89 24246 599 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ip.mpg.de

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München ( email )

Munich, 80539
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Emmanuel Asane-Otoo (Contact Author)

University of Oldenburg ( email )

Ammerländer Heerstraße 114-118
Oldenburg, D-26111
Germany

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