Crime and Self-Control Revisited: Disentangling the Effect of Self-Control on Risk and Social Preferences

33 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2014

See all articles by Tim Friehe

Tim Friehe

University of Konstanz - Department of Economics

Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch

Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Abstract

In economic models, risk and social preferences are major determinants of criminal behavior. In criminology, low self-control is considered a fundamental cause of crime. Relating the arguments from both disciplines, this paper studies the relationship between self-control and both risk and social preferences. To exogenously vary the level of self-control, we use a well-established experimental manipulation. We find that low self-control causes less risk-averse behavior. The effect of self-control on social preferences is not significant. In sum, our findings support the proposition that low self-control is a facilitator of crime. While our study is motivated by the literature on the determinants of criminal behavior, it has important implications for dual-system models and documents endogeneity of economic preferences.

Keywords: criminal behavior, risk preferences, social preferences, ego-depletion, dual-system models, experiment, endogeneity of economic preferences

JEL Classification: K42, H23, C91

Suggested Citation

Friehe, Tim and Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah, Crime and Self-Control Revisited: Disentangling the Effect of Self-Control on Risk and Social Preferences. IZA Discussion Paper No. 8109, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2426863 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2426863

Tim Friehe (Contact Author)

University of Konstanz - Department of Economics ( email )

Konstanz, D-78457
Germany

Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch

Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf ( email )

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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