New Evidence on the Social Security Incentives as Drivers of Retirement Behavior

21 Pages Posted: 7 May 2014 Last revised: 13 Nov 2014

See all articles by Alain Jousten

Alain Jousten

University of Liege; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Netspar; International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Ekaterina Tarantchenko

University of Liège - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 30, 2014

Abstract

The paper uses a rich administrative dataset on Belgian older workers to provide new evidence on the impact of social security systems on retirement behavior. In addition to measures of financial incentives induced by the social security systems, we construct an eligibility status indicator. This indicator flags individuals who satisfy eligibility requirements for early retirement schemes. We find that financial incentives do not have a lot of explanatory power for the probability to retire. In contrast, being eligible for early retirement substantially increases the chances for an individual to exit the labor force. Using these findings, we evaluate the impact of changes in the early retirement eligibility rules. These changes are shown to have important effects on the median retirement age of older workers.

Keywords: Social Security System, Financial Incentives, Eligibility, Retirement Behavior, Policy Simulations

JEL Classification: H55, J14, J21, J26, D91

Suggested Citation

Jousten, Alain and Tarantchenko, Ekaterina, New Evidence on the Social Security Incentives as Drivers of Retirement Behavior (October 30, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2429287 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2429287

Alain Jousten

University of Liege ( email )

Place des Orateurs 3
Batiment B31
4000 Liege
Belgium
+32 4 366 3198 (Phone)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Netspar

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Ekaterina Tarantchenko (Contact Author)

University of Liège - Department of Economics ( email )

7 Boulevard du Rectorat
Batiment B31
4000 Liege
Belgium

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