When Political Change Signals Community Resolve? Fiscal Decentralization, Grassroots Politics and Local Development

Posted: 10 May 2014 Last revised: 23 Nov 2019

See all articles by Sarmistha Pal

Sarmistha Pal

University of Surrey; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Jaideep Roy

Economics Department, University of Bath

Date Written: June 7, 2015

Abstract

This paper examines how the introduction of the Fiscal Decentralization (FD) at the turn of the Century that offered greater freedom in local governance affected grassroots politics and local development in Indonesia. We find that socio-culturally homogenous communities are more likely to experience a change in the way they select local leaders at the time of the introduction of FD and we identify multiple political transitions in this respect. We then compare local development outcomes of various politically treated communities (relative to those that did not experience any change) before and after FD to identify the causal effect of FD on local development: FD positively affected local development when it also induced community level political change (yielding new democracies and oligarchies). Moreover, this positive impact of change on local development was maximum when it gave rise to new grassroots democracy. We argue that change in grassroots politics at the critical juncture of the nation's history was key in fostering local development as it signalled community resolve for development and forced local political leadership to be more pro-people. But as costs of bringing about such changes is smaller with sociocultural homogeneity, such communities are more likely to engineer political change to reap the benefits of FD.

Keywords: Fiscal decentralization, Local politics, Political transition, Leader turnover; Local development

JEL Classification: C72, D72, D82

Suggested Citation

Pal, Sarmistha and Roy, Jaideep, When Political Change Signals Community Resolve? Fiscal Decentralization, Grassroots Politics and Local Development (June 7, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2433972 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2433972

Sarmistha Pal (Contact Author)

University of Surrey ( email )

Stag Hill
Guildford, England GU2 7XH
United Kingdom
01483 683995 (Phone)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Jaideep Roy

Economics Department, University of Bath ( email )

Claverton Down
Bath
Bath, BA15AY
United Kingdom

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