Illusion of Control and the Pursuit of Authority

22 Pages Posted: 15 May 2014

See all articles by Randolph Sloof

Randolph Sloof

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics & Business (FEB); Tinbergen Institute

Ferdinand von Siemens

Goethe University Frankfurt; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: April 14, 2014

Abstract

In a laboratory experiment, we measure subjects’ willingness to pay for a transparently useless decision right concerning the choice between two real effort tasks. We also elicit for each participant her change in beliefs about the likelihood of receiving her preferred task if she rather than another participant makes the decision. Participants pay more to keep control if they - irrationally - believe that they can increase the probability of getting their preferred task by keeping control. We thus document that illusion of control exists in a controlled environment with monetary incentives, and that illusion of control might affect people’s pursuit of authority.

Keywords: control preferences, illusion of control, allocation of decision rights

JEL Classification: C910, D230, D800

Suggested Citation

Sloof, Randolph and von Siemens, Ferdinand, Illusion of Control and the Pursuit of Authority (April 14, 2014). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4764, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2436849 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2436849

Randolph Sloof

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics & Business (FEB) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
+31 20 525 5241 (Phone)
+31 20 525 4310 (Fax)

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

Ferdinand Von Siemens (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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