Freedom and Legislation in Plato's Laws
Posted: 20 May 2014 Last revised: 2 Feb 2021
Date Written: October 10, 2013
Abstract
In this paper, I develop and defend a new interpretation of legislation in Plato’s final work, the Laws. There Plato emphasizes the free status of citizens and claims that a political community should secure willing obedience to law. I focus on Plato’s claim that in order to legislate in accordance with this free status, the lawgiver ought to attach preambles to laws, often called legal preludes. I criticize two prominent views of the purpose of the preludes: one that argues their aim is to impart an understanding of the good, and one that argues that their aim is to encourage correct action. I argue that both of these views have neglected the important connection between the use of preludes and their stated purpose, which is to treat the listener as free. Instead, I propose and defend an alternative view of their purpose: the preludes promote willing obedience to laws on the basis of their wisdom, though they do not bring about understanding of the reasons behind the law. When construed this way, the legal preludes evince a concern for the kind of freedom that is available to citizens who are subjected to law. The value of this freedom is not reducible to the lawgiver’s aim of intelligent rule, although the value is conditional on intelligent rule. This interpretation of the legal preludes suggests an answer to a fundamental problem raised by the idea of law — namely, how a coercive legal order can aim at both the happiness and the freedom of citizens.
Keywords: Plato, Law, Freedom, Political Authority
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