It Wasn't Me! Visibility and Free Riding in Waste Sorting

23 Pages Posted: 24 May 2014

See all articles by Alessandro Bucciol

Alessandro Bucciol

University of Verona - Department of Economics; Netspar

Natalia Montinari

University of Lund, School of Economics

Marco Piovesan

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 7, 2014

Abstract

Free riding problems can be more severe in multiple-person social dilemmas than in two-person dilemmas, since agents can hide their actions behind the veil of anonymity. In this paper, we use field data on waste sorting to study the effect of visibility in social dilemmas. We compare the sorting behavior of households sharing (or not) their bin for unsorted waste. Since households have to pay a fee proportional to their unsorted waste production, sharing the bin means sharing the fee. We find that, on average, household unsorted waste production is higher if three or more households share the same bin. Surprisingly, when only two households share the same bin, and therefore the household sorting behavior can be identified, unsorted waste production decreases compared to users not sharing the bin. Our interpretation is that shame and fear of punishment may play a role between the two sharing users.

Keywords: Social Dilemmas, Free Riding, Visibility, Waste Management

JEL Classification: D01, D78, Q53

Suggested Citation

Bucciol, Alessandro and Montinari, Natalia and Piovesan, Marco, It Wasn't Me! Visibility and Free Riding in Waste Sorting (May 7, 2014). Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 14-12, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2440753 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2440753

Alessandro Bucciol

University of Verona - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Cantarane 24
Verona, 37129
Italy
+39 045.802.8278 (Phone)
+39 045.802.8529 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.sites.google.com/site/abucciol/

Netspar ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Natalia Montinari

University of Lund, School of Economics ( email )

Tycho Brahes väg 1,
S-220 07 Lund, 223 63
Sweden

Marco Piovesan (Contact Author)

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5
Bygning 26
1353 Copenhagen K.
Denmark

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ku.dk/piovesan/

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