Appropriating the Commons - a Theoretical Explanation
59 Pages Posted: 10 Nov 2000
There are 2 versions of this paper
Appropriating the Commons - a Theoretical Explanation
Appropriating the Commons - a Theoretical Explanation
Date Written: May 2001
Abstract
In this paper we show that a simple model of reciprocal preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. However, when communication or informal sanctions are available appropriation behavior is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences.
Keywords: Common Pool Resources, Experiments, Fairness, Reciprocity, Game Theory, Fairness Models
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