Appropriating the Commons - a Theoretical Explanation

59 Pages Posted: 10 Nov 2000

See all articles by Armin Falk

Armin Falk

University of Bonn - Economic Science Area; briq - Institute on Behavior & Inequality

Ernst Fehr

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Urs Fischbacher

University of Konstanz - Faculty of Economics and Statistics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2001

Abstract

In this paper we show that a simple model of reciprocal preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. However, when communication or informal sanctions are available appropriation behavior is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences.

Keywords: Common Pool Resources, Experiments, Fairness, Reciprocity, Game Theory, Fairness Models

Suggested Citation

Falk, Armin and Fehr, Ernst and Fischbacher, Urs, Appropriating the Commons - a Theoretical Explanation (May 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244403 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.244403

Armin Falk (Contact Author)

University of Bonn - Economic Science Area ( email )

briq - Institute on Behavior & Inequality

Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5-9
Bonn, 53113
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.briq-institute.org/

Ernst Fehr

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Blümlisalpstrasse 10
Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland
+41 1 634 3709 (Phone)
+41 1 634 4907 (Fax)

Urs Fischbacher

University of Konstanz - Faculty of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Universitaetsstr. 10
78457 Konstanz
Germany

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