X-Games

20 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2014

See all articles by Kfir Eliaz

Kfir Eliaz

Brown University

Rani Spiegler

Tel Aviv University

Date Written: February 2014

Abstract

What is common to the following situations: incentivizing collective action in the presence of social preferences, monopoly pricing when consumers are loss averse, arms races when players are privately informed of their armament costs? We present a simple formalism, called X-games, which unifies these situations as well as others, and use it to unify and extend the separate analyses that they received in the literature.

Keywords: Contagion, Coordination, Externalities, Strategic complementarities

JEL Classification: C72

Suggested Citation

Eliaz, Kfir and Spiegler, Rani, X-Games (February 2014). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9814, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2444814

Kfir Eliaz (Contact Author)

Brown University ( email )

Economics Dept.
Box B
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-2112 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Kfir_Eliaz/

Rani Spiegler

Tel Aviv University ( email )

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