X-Games
20 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2014
Date Written: February 2014
Abstract
What is common to the following situations: incentivizing collective action in the presence of social preferences, monopoly pricing when consumers are loss averse, arms races when players are privately informed of their armament costs? We present a simple formalism, called X-games, which unifies these situations as well as others, and use it to unify and extend the separate analyses that they received in the literature.
Keywords: Contagion, Coordination, Externalities, Strategic complementarities
JEL Classification: C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Eliaz, Kfir and Spiegler, Rani, X-Games (February 2014). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9814, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2444814
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.