Maximum Likelihood Equilibria of Games with Population Uncertainty
CentER Working Paper No. 79
9 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2000
Date Written: September 2000
Abstract
In the games with population uncertainty introduced in this paper, the number and identity of the participating players are determined by chance. Games with population uncertainty are shown to include Poisson games and random-player games. The paper focuses on those strategy profiles that are most likely to yield a Nash equilibrium in the game selected by chance. Existence of maximum likelihood equilibria is established under mild topological conditions.
Keywords: Incomplete information, population uncertainty, maximum likelihood equilibria
JEL Classification: C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Voorneveld, Mark, Maximum Likelihood Equilibria of Games with Population Uncertainty (September 2000). CentER Working Paper No. 79, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244661 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.244661
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