A Dynamical Theory of Policy Networks

35 Pages Posted: 30 Jun 2014

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

This article presents the development of an abstract model of policy networks. The model builds on Downs’ (1957) democracy model, Tsebelis’ (2002) Veto Player Theory, and Kahneman and Tversky’s (2000(1979)) Prospect Theory. The dynamical theory of policy networks is based on social network analysis theory. I show that policy outcomes can be understood in the context of changes in the entire policy network’s structure. I demonstrate that the policymaking behavior of the entire policy network (i.e. the policy outcomes) is tied to the bargaining space. The bargaining space is a function of the degree centrality of the leader, his primary competitor, and the entire policy network. I draw on a ninety-year dataset that documents the relationships or connections between each full member of China’s Central Committee from 1922 to 2011. Their relationships are based on the fundamental Chinese conceptions of guanxi (or connections), which are known from each Central Committee member’s biographical data. These guanxi connections are: provincial origin, educational level, military experience, and known patron-client relationships. Strong correlation between changes in the bargaining space and the Central Committee’s foreign policy behavior towards the Republic of Taiwan during the periods 1949-1978 and 1984-1995 support my premise that policy outcomes are a function of the rival leaders’ degree centralities and the policy network’s centralization.

Keywords: Social network analysis, Policy networks, Chinese Central Committee

Suggested Citation

Sibayan, Jerome, A Dynamical Theory of Policy Networks (2014). APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2452632

Jerome Sibayan (Contact Author)

US Army War College ( email )

122 Forbes Avenue
Carlisle, PA 17013
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
72
Abstract Views
514
Rank
585,331
PlumX Metrics