Optimal Firms’ Mix in Oligopoly with Twofold Environmental Externality
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N° 955
20 Pages Posted: 10 Jul 2014
Date Written: July 9, 2014
Abstract
We charaterise the socially optimal mix of firms in an oligopoly with both profit-seeking and labour-managed firms. The policy maker faces a twofold externality: (i) production entails the exploitation of a common pool natural resource and (ii) production/consumption pollutes the environment. We study the relationship between firms' mix and social welfare in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the industry and the resulting policy implications.
Keywords: mixed oligopoly, pollution, resource extraction
JEL Classification: L13, H23, P13, Q50
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Delbono, Flavio and Lambertini, Luca, Optimal Firms’ Mix in Oligopoly with Twofold Environmental Externality (July 9, 2014). Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N° 955, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2464072 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2464072
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