The Royal Lie

9 Pages Posted: 27 Jul 2014

See all articles by Mareike Hoffmann

Mareike Hoffmann

University of Cologne

Thomas Lauer

University of Cologne; University of Erfurt

Bettina Rockenbach

University of Cologne

Date Written: March 23, 2013

Abstract

According to the Greek philosopher Plato “[. . .] if anyone at all is to have the privilege of lying the rulers of the State [. . .] may be allowed to lie for the public good” (The Royal Lie). To investigate whether The Royal Lie may foster cooperation in public goods provision we experimentally study centralized manipulations of contribution feedback. We find that a uniform feedback exaggeration does not increase cooperation and is disapproved once it is disclosed. An individual exaggeration, however, that gives nobody the feeling of being a sucker sustains cooperation on a high level.

Keywords: Public goods provision, Feedback manipulation, Lying, Experiment

JEL Classification: D03, H41, D02, C92

Suggested Citation

Hoffmann, Mareike and Lauer, Thomas and Rockenbach, Bettina, The Royal Lie (March 23, 2013). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 93, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2472106

Mareike Hoffmann

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

Thomas Lauer

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

University of Erfurt ( email )

Internationales Buro
Nordhaeuser Str. 63
D - 99089 Erfurt
Germany
99089 (Fax)

Bettina Rockenbach (Contact Author)

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany
++49 470 8664 (Phone)
++49 470 8668 (Fax)

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