A Comparative Analysis of Constitutional and Political Restrictions on the Use of Force
24 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2014 Last revised: 4 Nov 2014
Date Written: August 7, 2014
Abstract
The centrality of ‘institutional constraints’ as an important part of the explanation for the interdemocratic peace – and democratic conflict behavior more generally – has long been emphasized. Yet, albeit a few exceptions, the literature on democracy and conflict involvement has largely neglected this source of intrademocratic variation. This backdrop prompts several questions: Which kinds of restrictions on the use of force exist among democracies and how do these constrain foreign policy decision-making? To which extent can we observe variation with regards to constitutional provisions and parliamentary involvement? Finally, does the initial decision whether to deploy forces relate to the formulation of mandates, as in how a country decides to become involved in a military operation?
This paper has a twofold aim: The main part of the paper introduces a conceptual framework of foreign policy constraints in contemporary democracies, distinguishing between structural, procedural, and operational restrictions. It is argued that these are governed by different causal mechanisms, which need to kept analytically separate. For instance, structural restrictions are relatively stable over time and they usually exert an effect on foreign policy without the consideration of additional factors. Procedural restrictions, on the other hand, constitute a veto point only in combination with distinct political preferences. The empirical part of the paper investigates these types of restrictions across nine democracies, seeking to provide a systematic inventory of prevalent restrictions across the selected countries.
Keywords: institutionalism, use of force, democracy, war, constitutionalism, institutional constraints, democratic peace
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