Firm-Initiated Clawback Provisions and Audit Committee Quality
American Accounting Association Mid-Atlantic Conference Proceedings, p. 41, 2014
Posted: 14 Aug 2014
Date Written: April 25, 2014
Abstract
We examine the audit committee characteristics for S&P 600 firms that voluntarily adopt clawback provisions in their executive contracts. We find empirical evidence to show that audit committees in firms with voluntary clawback provisions meet more often, are larger, and have a larger proportion of female directors when compared to non-clawback firms.
Keywords: Clawbacks, clawback provisions, voluntary, audit committee, quality, S&P 600, female directors
JEL Classification: M4, M41, M42, M48
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Mburu, Henry and Makkawi, Bilal and Thiruvadi, Sheela, Firm-Initiated Clawback Provisions and Audit Committee Quality (April 25, 2014). American Accounting Association Mid-Atlantic Conference Proceedings, p. 41, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2479710
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.