Firm-Initiated Clawback Provisions and Audit Committee Quality

American Accounting Association Mid-Atlantic Conference Proceedings, p. 41, 2014

Posted: 14 Aug 2014

See all articles by Henry Mburu

Henry Mburu

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF EASTERN AFRICA

Bilal Makkawi

Morgan State University - Department of Accounting and Finance

Sheela Thiruvadi

Morgan State University

Date Written: April 25, 2014

Abstract

We examine the audit committee characteristics for S&P 600 firms that voluntarily adopt clawback provisions in their executive contracts. We find empirical evidence to show that audit committees in firms with voluntary clawback provisions meet more often, are larger, and have a larger proportion of female directors when compared to non-clawback firms.

Keywords: Clawbacks, clawback provisions, voluntary, audit committee, quality, S&P 600, female directors

JEL Classification: M4, M41, M42, M48

Suggested Citation

Mburu, Henry and Makkawi, Bilal and Thiruvadi, Sheela, Firm-Initiated Clawback Provisions and Audit Committee Quality (April 25, 2014). American Accounting Association Mid-Atlantic Conference Proceedings, p. 41, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2479710

Henry Mburu (Contact Author)

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF EASTERN AFRICA ( email )

P. O. BOX 62157
00200
NAIROBI, 00200
Kenya
+254739268665 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cuea.edu

Bilal Makkawi

Morgan State University - Department of Accounting and Finance ( email )

Baltimore, MD 21251
United States

Sheela Thiruvadi

Morgan State University ( email )

1700 E. Cold Spring Ln
Baltimore, MD 21251
United States

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