Decision Rights: Freedom, Power, and Interference

72 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2014 Last revised: 22 May 2017

See all articles by Claudia Neri

Claudia Neri

University of St. Gallen

Hendrik Rommeswinkel

National Taiwan University - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 2017

Abstract

We propose a general model of decision-rights allocation and choice, formulated in the context of a dynamic psychological game. Decision rights are valued not only according to the value of the outcomes, but also according to the procedure by which outcomes are achieved. We introduce freedom, power, and interference as such procedural motivations. In a novel laboratory experiment, we separately measure freedom, power, and interference preferences. Interference aversion best explains participants' behavior. Most participants value decision rights not because they enjoy having freedom of choice or power over others, but because they dislike letting others interfere in their outcomes.

Keywords: decision rights, psychological games, freedom, power, interference, experiments, procedural preferences

JEL Classification: C92, D03, D23, D82

Suggested Citation

Neri, Claudia and Rommeswinkel, Hendrik, Decision Rights: Freedom, Power, and Interference (May 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2485107 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2485107

Claudia Neri (Contact Author)

University of St. Gallen ( email )

Varnbüelstrasse 19
St. Gallen, CH-9000
Switzerland
+41-71-224-2757 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.claudianeri.com

Hendrik Rommeswinkel

National Taiwan University - Department of Economics ( email )

21 Hsiu Chow Rd
Taipei, 10020
Taiwan

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