Decision Rights: Freedom, Power, and Interference
72 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2014 Last revised: 22 May 2017
Date Written: May 2017
Abstract
We propose a general model of decision-rights allocation and choice, formulated in the context of a dynamic psychological game. Decision rights are valued not only according to the value of the outcomes, but also according to the procedure by which outcomes are achieved. We introduce freedom, power, and interference as such procedural motivations. In a novel laboratory experiment, we separately measure freedom, power, and interference preferences. Interference aversion best explains participants' behavior. Most participants value decision rights not because they enjoy having freedom of choice or power over others, but because they dislike letting others interfere in their outcomes.
Keywords: decision rights, psychological games, freedom, power, interference, experiments, procedural preferences
JEL Classification: C92, D03, D23, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation