The Duty to Work Without a Wage. A Legal Comparison between the Social Assistance Legislations in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom

European Journal of Social Security 16 (3)

26 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 2014 Last revised: 16 Oct 2014

See all articles by Anja Eleveld

Anja Eleveld

VU University Amsterdam - Faculty of Law

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

Since the rise of the activation paradigm in the 1990s, the duty to work without a wage has become widespread in European social assistance legislation. This paper investigates in a precise way the extent to which the duty to work without a wage follows the legal logic of a contractual relationship and how this duty is related to the fundamental right to an adequate standard of living. A comparison between German, Dutch and British social assistance legislation shows that the duty to work without a wage increasingly takes the form of a reciprocity requirement. That is, instead of re-integrating into regular paid work, recipients of social assistance are required to show that they are worthy of attaining basic social rights, not only by improving their capability to work but, above all, by showing a willingness to work. It concludes that the duty to work without a wage enhances governmental control over recipients of social assistance rather than improving their employability and notes that, in this respect, the Dutch social assistance regime seems to be stricter than the German and British ones.

Keywords: Social assistance, workfare, legal comparison, activation policies, social rights

Suggested Citation

Eleveld, Anja, The Duty to Work Without a Wage. A Legal Comparison between the Social Assistance Legislations in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (2014). European Journal of Social Security 16 (3), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2495376

Anja Eleveld (Contact Author)

VU University Amsterdam - Faculty of Law ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

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