Hedging Market Risk in Optimal Liquidation

24 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2014 Last revised: 28 Sep 2017

See all articles by Phillip Monin

Phillip Monin

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Date Written: October 7, 2014

Abstract

Financial institutions commonly face the risk that large trades will execute at unfavorable prices due to price impact effects from insufficient market liquidity. A typical method to manage these price impact effects is to split a given order into smaller pieces and to trade these pieces sequentially over time. Such a strategy, however, is exposed to market risk. Unlike price impact, market risk can be hedged. This paper explores the market risk management of the liquidation of a large trade that is subject to price impact. Specifically, we consider an investor, such as a large financial institution or a broker-dealer, who must a priori liquidate a large position in a primary risky asset whose price is influenced by the investor's liquidation strategy. The investor hedges the market risk involved with liquidation by simultaneously taking a position in a liquid proxy asset that is imperfectly correlated with the primary asset. We show that the optimal strategies for an investor with a finite investment horizon and constant absolute risk aversion are deterministic and we find them explicitly using the calculus of variations. We find that the liquidation strategy for an investor able to hedge market risk is the same as the liquidation strategy of a less risk-averse investor without such a hedge. Similarly, the liquidation strategy for an investor able to hedge market risk is the same as for an investor facing higher price impact effects but without the ability to hedge market risk.

Keywords: optimal liquidation, optimal execution, hedging market risk, block trades, indifference price

JEL Classification: G00, G11, G21, G24

Suggested Citation

Monin, Phillip, Hedging Market Risk in Optimal Liquidation (October 7, 2014). Office of Financial Research Working Paper 14-08, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2500845 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2500845

Phillip Monin (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

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