Publish or Perish? Incentives and Careers in Italian Academia

54 Pages Posted: 25 Sep 2014

See all articles by Daniele Checchi

Daniele Checchi

Università degli Studi di Milano - Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Aziendale (DEPA); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; IRVAPP

Gianni De Fraja

Universita' di Roma; University of Nottingham; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Stefano Verzillo

European Commission, Joint Research Centre

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2014

Abstract

We derive a theoretical model of effort in the presence of career concern based on the multi-unit all-pay auction, and closely inspired by the Italian academic market. In this model, the number of applicants, the number of new posts, and the relative importance of the determinants of promotion determine academics' effort. Because of the specific characteristics of Italian universities, where incentives operate only through promotion, and where all appointment panels are drawn from strictly separated and relatively narrow scientific sectors, the model fits well Italian academia, and we test it in a newly constructed dataset which collects the journal publications of all Italian academics working in universities. We find that individual researchers respond to incentives in the manner predicted by the theoretical model: more capable researchers respond to increases in the importance of the measurable determinants of promotion and in the competitiveness of the scientific sector by exerting more effort; less able researchers do the opposite.

Keywords: academic job market, applied auction theory, career concerns, nepotism, publications

JEL Classification: D44, I21, I23, M51

Suggested Citation

Checchi, Daniele and De Fraja, Gianni and De Fraja, Gianni and Verzillo, Stefano, Publish or Perish? Incentives and Careers in Italian Academia (July 2014). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10084, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2501558

Daniele Checchi (Contact Author)

Università degli Studi di Milano - Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Aziendale (DEPA) ( email )

Milan, 20122
Italy
+39 02 5032 1519 (Phone)
+39 02 5032 1505 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

IRVAPP ( email )

Via Santa Croce 77
Trento, I-38122
Italy

Gianni De Fraja

University of Nottingham ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom

Universita' di Roma ( email )

Dipartimento SEFEMEQ
Via Columbia n.2
Rome, Rome 00133
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.economia.uniroma2.it/docenti

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Stefano Verzillo

European Commission, Joint Research Centre ( email )

Via Fermi
Ispra, Varese 21027
Italy

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