Risk-Sharing and Crises: Global Games of Regime Change with Endogenous Wealth
50 Pages Posted: 1 Oct 2014
Date Written: January 2013
Abstract
I add heterogeneous agents and risk-sharing opportunities to a global game of regime change. The novel insight is that when there is a risk-sharing motive, fundamentals drive not only individual behavior, but also select which individuals are more relevant for the likelihood of a crisis because of endogenous shifts in wealth. If attacking is relatively safe, attack behavior in the global game and trade in state-contingent assets feed back into each other. This feedback implies that multiple equilibria may exist even if signal noise becomes arbitrarily small. In addition, heterogeneity in risk-aversion within the population amplifies the influence of the state of the economy on the probability of a crisis.
Keywords: global games, risk-aversion, heterogeneous agents, risk sharing, financial crises, strategic risk
JEL Classification: D8, G2, E3
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation