Who Governs Global Affairs? The Role of Institutional Corruption in U.S. Foreign Policy

28 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2014

See all articles by Simona Ross

Simona Ross

Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics

Date Written: October 9, 2014

Abstract

Since the mid-twentieth century, the United States has emerged as a global superpower wielding influence on the lives of millions around the world. The foreign policy decisions of U.S. lawmakers have a global reach and should not be shaped by special interests. This paper analyzes the dynamics of campaign finance and lobbying in U.S. foreign policy through the lens of institutional corruption. The central argument is that the business community possesses the resources necessary to influence foreign policy leaders and frame global affairs in ways that fit its interests. Ethnic groups and foreign governments have also been shown to be highly influential when they hire K Street lobbying firms to persuade lawmakers. And while think tanks are known for their role as a source of expertise on global affairs that guide the foreign policy debate, evidence suggests that their research is also influenced by corporate agendas. One of the most surprising and unfortunate findings is that the public is the least influential group among actors aiming to shape U.S. foreign policy.

Keywords: Institutional corruption, Campaign finance, Lobbying, Foreign policy, Global affairs, Ethnic lobbying, Foreign lobbying, Israel lobby, Defense contractors, Oil corporations, Think tanks, Iran nuclear talks, War profiteering, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Morocco, Equatorial Guinea

Suggested Citation

Ross, Simona, Who Governs Global Affairs? The Role of Institutional Corruption in U.S. Foreign Policy (October 9, 2014). Edmond J. Safra Working Papers, No. 49, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2507452 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2507452

Simona Ross (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics ( email )

124 Mount Auburn Street
Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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