Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking

Journal of Peace Research; (2001) DOI: 10.1177/0022343302039004007

Posted: 28 Oct 2014

See all articles by Tony Addison

Tony Addison

United Nations University

Syed Mansoob Murshed

Institute of Social Studies (ISS)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2001

Abstract

The paper analyses credibility and reputation in the context of peace negotiations. Where war provides economic gains to one side, peace is not incentive compatible, and peace agreements will necessarily degenerate, as they become time inconsistent. Levels of conflict are an increasing function of greed and rents, but decreasing in the direct costs of war. In a multiple period framework there is some uncertainty regarding the type of negotiator and for high values of the discount rate more conflict is chosen. Sanctions, aid and direct intervention, if effective, could eliminate conflict, as well as help in devising commitment technologies.

Keywords: peace agreements, credibility, reputation, conflict, aid

Suggested Citation

Addison, Tony and Murshed, Syed Mansoob, Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking (February 2001). Journal of Peace Research; (2001) DOI: 10.1177/0022343302039004007 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2515262

Tony Addison (Contact Author)

United Nations University ( email )

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Syed Mansoob Murshed

Institute of Social Studies (ISS) ( email )

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