Crises as Opportunities for Growth: The Strategic Value of Business Group Affiliation

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming

European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 781/2021

76 Pages Posted: 2 Nov 2014 Last revised: 6 Jan 2022

See all articles by Ronald W. Masulis

Ronald W. Masulis

University of New South Wales, Sydney; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Financial Research Network (FIRN); National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER)

Peter K. Pham

University of Sydney Business School; Institute of Global Finance, UNSW Business School; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

Jason Zein

UNSW Business School; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

Alvin E. S. Ang

CUHK Business School, Chinese University of Hong Kong

Date Written: December 21, 2021

Abstract

We document a novel strategic motive for family business groups to utilize their internal capital markets (ICMs) during financial crises. We find that crisis-period group ICM activity is targeted toward exerting product market dominance over standalone rivals. Groups make significant post-crisis gains in market share that are concentrated among affiliates (and industry segments within affiliates) operating in highly competitive product markets, where capturing such gains is difficult in normal times. These patterns are observed only in emerging markets, suggesting that ICMs enable groups to exploit crises to realize long-term competitive advantages only when rivals face chronic financing frictions.

Keywords: Family business groups, Internal capital markets, Product market competition, Financial crisis

JEL Classification: G01, G31, G32

Suggested Citation

Masulis, Ronald W. and Pham, Peter Kien and Zein, Jason and Ang, Alvin E. S., Crises as Opportunities for Growth: The Strategic Value of Business Group Affiliation (December 21, 2021). Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 781/2021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2517810 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2517810

Ronald W. Masulis

University of New South Wales, Sydney ( email )

UNSW Business School
High St
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia
612-9385-5860 (Phone)
612-9385-6347 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Financial Research Network (FIRN)

C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.firn.org.au

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) ( email )

BIZ 2 Storey 4, 04-05
1 Business Link
Singapore, 117592
Singapore

Peter Kien Pham (Contact Author)

University of Sydney Business School ( email )

Cnr. of Codrington and Rose Streets
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia
+61 2 9036 9103 (Phone)
+61 2 9351 6461 (Fax)

Institute of Global Finance, UNSW Business School ( email )

UNSW Business School
High St
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

Financial Research Network (FIRN) ( email )

C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.firn.org.au

Jason Zein

UNSW Business School ( email )

Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia
+61 2 93855858 (Phone)
+61 2 93855858 (Fax)

Financial Research Network (FIRN)

C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.firn.org.au

Alvin E. S. Ang

CUHK Business School, Chinese University of Hong Kong ( email )

Cheng Yu Tung Building
12 Chak Cheung Street
Shatin
Hong Kong

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
650
Abstract Views
3,497
Rank
75,583
PlumX Metrics